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1 Phenomenology and pragmatism are philosophical movements similar and contrasting at
the same time. Some scholars wonder about the possibility of a common domain, while
others discuss the risk of their resemblances.1 Even if these movements are different in
tradition and place, it seems to be possible to discover not only an encounter but even a
connection between them. As Benoist remarked, in fact, there is a fundamental likeness
between  their  methods  which  can  even  lead  to  recognizing  them  as  two
“phenomenologies.”  Indeed,  both  look  at  ‘things  themselves,’  exploiting  a  similar
descriptive approach .
2 In the context of American philosophy a sort of dialogue has taken place over the years,
thanks to an understanding of differing pathways as well as an understanding of the
common background of philosophic history. Though the role of phenomenology is not
predominant in American philosophy, it is becoming greater than in past years. Toward
the end of the 1950’s Gurtwisch lamented: “As far as the situation in United States is
concerned, the unfortunate fact of the matter is that Husserl’s writings are hardly studied
at all […]. Phenomenology is not permitted to exert the invigorating influence it might
have on American philosophy,  which thus deprives itself  of  the vitalization,  it  might
derive from the philosophic substance and radicalism of Husserl’s work.”2 Gurtwisch was
the first  philosopher  who presented the radicalism of  phenomenology as  a  heuristic
instrument  for  revitalizing  the  main  currents  of  American  thought.  Indeed,
phenomenology was construed not as a redoing of what masters did, but as a creative
appropriation of a framework and a method, which is concerned with the crucial and
traditional philosophic problems. Conversely, in the article which appeared in April 1973
in the Monist,  Pragmatism Reconsidered,  pragmatism was described as the bearer of an
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unsystematic welter of philosophic insights, from which various movements could draw
on in showing that the pragmatists were really realists or idealists, logical or positivists
and now budding phenomenologists.3
3 Therefore,  both  phenomenology  and pragmatism are  pluralistic  approaches  to  doing
philosophy and they can be useful to fill in each other’s lacks. Their convergences as well
their divergences can be explored and allowed to develop, before we attempt to establish
the clear and irrevocable lines of demarcation which necessarily separate them. As Edie
wrote, this process contrives to lay bare a unique philosophic network of complexity and
it can annihilate a delicate, elusive network with its own philosophic strength.4
We believe that a firm link between phenomenology and pragmatism takes its origin from
a Husserlian reading of James. Indeed, it is historically attested that Husserl read the
Principles  and  perhaps  the  critical  35  pages  of  the  summary  elaborated  by  Marty.
Therefore, James seems to have exerted a certain influence on Husserlian work. Even
before  the  flourishing  of  phenomenology,  it  is  likely  that  the  direction  of  Husserl’s
analysis toward what he called the ‘phenomenological,’ was affected by the Principles.5 As
it concerns our topic, it is worthwhile to emphasize that Husserl and James carried on
similar approaches to the study of consciousness. Both presented an idea of will in which
the epistemological layer seems to be predominant and thus to prevent any moral deed.
By inference, their description of will lowers the range of action of freedom. Therefore,
we are going to make a comparison between Jamesian and Husserlian analysis of will as
presented in chapter XXVI of James’ Principles and in Husserl’s ethical lectures of 1914. 
Singling out the points of uniqueness of the two currents, we will be able to study the
common network more deeply, as well as the differences between the two philosophers.
 
II. Husserl and James
4 In 1891/92 Husserl took a class on psychology and on that occasion he read the Principles 
for the first  time.  That probably came about as a result  of  advice from Stumpf,  who
encountered James when he was in Europe in 1882. Though Husserl admitted being able
to understand just a portion of the volume, he admired the audacity and originality of
Jamesian analysis. In May 1894 he came back to Principles, while he was working on his
logic and its elementary concepts and he praised the Jamesian effort of “depsychologizing
psychology.” At that time he had planned to publish a series of articles in the Philosophishe
Monatshefte, but he published only the first and decided to wait to see what James had
done, before publishing the others.6 The next article is probably his Psychological Studies
for Elementary Logic.
5 The  subjects  that  mostly  caught  Husserl’s  interest  were  those  about  Intention
Wahrnehmende. As it is possible to see from his library, he read above all chapters 24, 25
and 26  of  the  second volume of  Principles  and the  article  entitled  Knowing  of  Things
Together. He found James’ psychology “einige Blitz”7 and he recognized some similarities
with his work. He even affirmed that his “Identifikation von Interesse und Wille” tied in
with his “uralten Vorlesungen über Psychologie.”8 Therefore Husserl was the first person
to  make  a  comparison  between  his  analysis  and  that  of  James.9 There  is  in  fact  a
continuity  between the  two.  Although Principles  and the  ethical  lectures  of  1914  are
elaborated from two different perspectives, they almost reach common conclusions. In
our opinion both James and Husserl identified the will  as a rational faculty,  which is
characterized  above  all  by  an  epistemological  layer.  This  involves  some  difficulties
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regarding the notion of freedom. Indeed, if the will can act only when it knows what it
can do, its fiat is always related to the knowledge and consequently its freedom to act is
always connected to the epistemological reason of the subject. The will and its freedom
need an epistemological basis to know what it is right to do. In the following sections we
will see how this thesis is developed.
 
III. What is Consciousness?
6 The  study  of  consciousness  is  the  main  key  to  figuring  out  how Husserl  and  James
conceive  of  the  will.  To  have  an overall  idea  about  it,  it  is  necessary to  explain  its
structure (if it has one) and its relationship with the outside world. Both philosophers
construe consciousness as a realm of pure experience.
7 According to James, consciousness is a neutral unit, that we might be able to describe
with minimum assumptions  like  “Thought  goes  on” or  “It  thinks.”10 As  he wrote:  “I
believe that ‘consciousness,’ once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is
on the point of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to
a place among first principles.”11 The underlying statement is that consciousness does not
exist. This is due to its insubstantiality; consciousness is not a specific entity, but it is a
stream of thoughts and data about subjective experience. It is a “function of knowing,” a
tool which, by its nature, is selective, fluid, and personal; an instrument founded upon
logic, which serves to create an inner coherent reality. James represents consciousness as
a  continuous  process.  For  example,  he  considers  sleep  a  “time-gap”  during  which
consciousness sinks and remains intact.  In fact,  upon awakening people are the same
person they were before sleep. James’ theory of consciousness denotes it as a being most
closely related to thought and awareness of oneself in the world during waking moments. It
is depicted as a persistent flow of thoughts which sets up a relationship between inner
and outside world.
8 This description is very near the phenomenological one. Indeed, both Husserl and James
consider  consciousness  as  a  function.12 Wilshire  maintains  that  James  modifies  his
perspective in the analysis of consciousness from the behaviorist tradition, in which he
begins his study of psychology, toward a properly phenomenological viewpoint.13 Even if
James falls short of the phenomenological terminology of intentionality, he suggests a
definition  of  consciousness  as  a  flow  of  pure  experience.  According  to  James,
consciousness exists just as a function of knowing. “It is supposed necessary to explain
the fact that things not only are, but get reported, are known. Whoever blots out the
notion of consciousness from his list of first principles must still provide in some way for
that function’s being carried on.”14 Consciousness consists in its pure epistemological and
flowing  relation  with  the  external  world.  It  can  be  in  flux  because  every  unit  of
experience is fringed by feelings of anticipa- tion, proximity, continuity etc., and it is an
epistemological current, because all its perceptual experiences are expressed just on the
level of language.15
9 Thus, it is here that we might find a common field between James and Husserl, because
both  seek  to  describe  the  experience  of  consciousness  as  an  absolute  realm  which
antedates  every  quantitative  distinction.  As  Perry  remarks,  there  is  no  material
anywhere, only data. The entire world is a datum which is made up of two parts, the
objective and subjective part, seen retrospectively.16 Nevertheless, it is not easy to reach
the pure flux of consciousness because of its pureness; when we touch it, it turns into the
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first person. According to James, the pursuit of the original material of pure experience
becomes  a  sort  of  mythical  quest  to  get  beneath  even  the  individual  stream  of
consciousness, to discover the neutral constituents of both psychic and physical reality.
Although  a  pure  full  return  to  the  world  of  pure  experience  is  not  possible,  James
suggests  that  we might attain at  least  a partial  awareness of  the relative purity and
simplicity of the pre-conceptual flow of perceptual experience. He writes in fact:  “All
homes  are  infinite  experience.”  In  a  similar  way,  phenomenology  postulates  a  ‘pre-
empirical origin,’ a standpoint apart from experience from which it may be evaluated,
surveyed or understood. Both Principles and phenomenological research are characterized
by  an archaeological  strategy.  Jamesian  and  Husserlian  methods  consist  in  digging
beneath  the  succeeding  strata  of  conceptual  organization  to  reach  the  original  pre-
structured field of perceptual experience. In this sense their methods can be compared.
10 Moreover, according to James, the steps that lead to knowledge are sensation, perception
and conception. By means of sensations we have an acquaintance with the facts or rather
we become the facts. Attention guides the aim of our sensations and transforms them into
perception. In fact, the flow of pure sensations is nothing but an imaginary construct
which James invents in order to explain the element of facticity which characterizes our
primitive perception. Indeed, perception makes possible the “knowledge about a fact.”17
The third level of knowledge is the level of conception, which focuses on one aspect of the
stream and excludes the others. Perception provides the initial relational context upon
which conception operates and the sphere to which conception must return. The most
important  feature  of  conception  consists  in  its  consists  in  its  ability  to  grasp  and
recognize the sameness the sameness,  which enables us to abstract from the infinite
variety of  details  and to have knowledge about a specific part of  reality.  ‘Knowledge
about’ describes, defines, tells us what an object is.
11 Even if the early stages of the Principles are characterized by a deliberate evasion from
any metaphysical analysis of consciousness and from any epistemological consideration
of it, they always turn out to be related to the pure epistemological path of consciousness.
18 Every  step  of the  life  of  consciousness  is  an  instrument  for  its  epistemological
knowledge.  “Knowing  must  have  a  vehicle.  Call  the  vehicle  Ego,  or  call  it  Thought,
Psychosis, Soul, Intelligence, Consciousness, Mind, Reason, Feeling, – what you like – it
must know.”19 Therefore, the will must be one of the tools of knowledge that allows the
soul  to  perceive  and  discover  the  world.  As  he  wrote:  “Now,  for  instance,  the  soul
manifests  its  faculty  of  memory,  now  of  reasoning,  now  of  volition,  or  again  its
imagination or its appetite.”20 Reason is a faculty we have at our disposal in order to
create a system of conceptions of our reality. “What the ordinary psychologies call ‘ideas’
are  nothing  but  parts  of  the  total  object  of  representation.”21 In  his  lectures  on
pragmatism, James frequently asserts that ideas,  which are experiential  data,  become
true only in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with the other parts of
experience.  Like conception,  ideas are the result of  a living relationship between the
subject  and the world.  Their  function is  to  guide us  from one unit  of  experience to
another by diverse routes which are also features of experience. The whole process of
knowledge takes place within the confines of the stream of experience. The will, too, is
encompassed in this three-step process. It is a useful way to gain perceptive data and to
create new conceptions. An idea becomes true by means of a referential process which
takes place entirely within the network of experience. The transcendence of an object
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refers simply to the possibility of further determinations of the same object beyond the
present field of experience.
 
a) Husserlian Definition of Consciousness
12 As Spiegelberg remarks,  the chapter of  Principles  in which James explains his idea of
sensation, perception and conception, is filled with notations of Husserl.22 Husserl shares
with James a common account of the life of consciousness. Like James, Husserl seeks to
reach a clear definition of its realm. In Logical Investigations the analysis revolves around
consciousness  and its  pure contents,  since it  has  been reckoned as  a  source of  pure
principles of logic. Indeed phenomenology is that method aimed at the clarification of the
contents of consciousness in order to found a pure logic.23 These aims account for an
epistemological definition of consciousness as a pure flow of meanings. In the fifth Logical
Investigations he makes a distinction among three definitions of consciousness, all focused
on the link between acts  and consciousness.  To begin with,  consciousness is  what  is
merely experienced.24 It  is  the wholeness of  all  the acts  and the utmost reach of  its
knowledge.  It  corresponds to a  system of  acts  and to our perception of  this  system.
Husserl’s second notion of consciousness merely adds to the first one the idea according
to which its immanent components are adequately perceived by an ‘inner consciousness’
(Gewahrwerden).  Every  datum  is  the  content  of  a  lived  experience  (Erlebnis) of
consciousness.  In  the  third  definition  Husserl  depicts  consciousness  as  an  overall
understanding of  pure lived experience.  This  involves  an “another  experience which
requires a new percept”25 and it accompanies every perception.
13 This third conception consists, to a fair degree, of a concentrated analysis of what Husserl
called the ‘objectifying interpretatio’ in his first conception of consciousness.26 Husserl
now  calls  this  ‘objectifying  interpretation’  the  act-matter,  and  opposes  it  to  the
actquality. The matter and the quality of the act together form its intentional essence.
Both are immanent components of the intentional act itself. The matter is the component
that supplies the 'reference' to an object.  Following Husserl,  the matter must be that
element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly
definite that it does not merely fix the object meant in a general way, but also the precise
way in which it  is  meant.27 The matter is  what gives consciousness its  ‘directedness’
towards an object, or, in terms of intentionality, it is the 'intending' of the object. There
can be several acts directed to the same object, and each of these acts can mean the object
in a different way, i.e., each one can be directed to a different property of the object. The
matter is  the directedness towards an object,  and it  is  the directedness towards one
specific  property  of  the  object.  In  general,  the  matter  is  the  aspect  of  the  act  that
determines what it is conscious of. In contrast to this, the quality of the act is the aspect
that determines the way the act is conscious of the object. The quality “stamps an act as
merely representative, judgmental, emotional, desiderative, etc.”28 A series of acts can
have the same matter with only the qualities of the acts changing. I can doubt, assert,
wish, question, or be fearful that there are “intelligent beings on Mars”; all these acts
have one and the same matter, the “intelligent beings on Mars,” with different qualities,
the doubting, asserting, wishing, etc.
14 Husserl conceives consciousness as a realm of pure and absolute rationality which holds a
relationship  with  the  outside  world  by  means  of  its  rational  tools.29 “Das
Vernunftbewußtsein ist aber nicht das Bewusstsein überhaupt […] - denn vielleicht ist […]
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im  wesentlicher  Analogie  dem  theoretischen  oder  besser  überhaupt  dem  doxischen
Vernunftbewußtsein  ein  axiotisches  […]  und  praktisches  mit  mannigfaltigen
eigentümlich Gestaltungen beizuordnen.”30 Consciousness is a rational sphere which can
be modalized according to the several qualities and matters of its acts. Its rationality can
be logical, axiological, practical and so forth, because of the direction and contents of its
acts.  Moreover,  all  these  regions  of  reason  are  presented  as  the  rational  roots  of
correspondent theories, such as logic, ethics, axiology. Husserl writes in fact: “Wie der
formalen  Logik  ein  System  fundamentaler  Strukturen  des  Glaubensbewußtseins  (des
doxischen,  wie  ich  zu  sagen  pflege)  entspricht  und  somit  eine  Phänomenologie  und
Theorie der formalen Erkenntnis, so ähnlich verhält es sich mit der formalen Axiologie
und Praktik hinsichtlich der ihnen prinzipiell zugehörigen Disziplin der Phänomenologie
bzw.  der  Wertungs-  und  Willenstheorie.”31 The  will  is  one  of  the  several  regions  of
consciousness and it is one of its tools for understanding and experiencing the outside
world.
15 Every kind of knowledge is the result of the relationship between living consciousness
and  the external  world.  In  consciousness  there  is  a  rational  root  for  every  kind  of
knowledge and ideas are just the product of the activity of consciousness. Every idea is
made up of the interpreting act of consciousness and its matter, or in different terms, by
its quality and matter. According to Husserl and to James, the idea is a guiding concept
resulting from the match between subjective perception and reality. Its structure is a sort
of index to recollect every moment of perception and knowledge. Therefore, for both
philosophers, every act has an epistemological nuance, because it is tied to the process of
knowledge in an active or passive way in order to interpret reality. Every act is not a
finished concept, but is, instead, open, like the life of consciousness. Both philosophers
stress the original flow of experience of consciousness and make an extraordinary effort
to approach the fullness of experience without prejudices with respect to all aspects of
givenness in the flow of experience. This philosophic attitude leads them to draw up a
definition of consciousness in which the epistemological activity is invasive toward other
attitudes. Thus the questions we pose are the following: how do they describe the will and
its  freedom?  Can  the  will  maintain  its  moral  grasp?  Can  freedom  be  thought  of
independently from knowledge or is it just one of the epistemological modes?
 
IV. The Will in James
16 In James the will is described as a particular faculty of consciousness. For James, it is ‘an
emotional  movement,’32 which  acts  thanks  to  memory.  Without  the  performance  of
previous movements already experienced, no new voluntary movement is possible, but
just  an  involuntary  or  passive  one.  “There  is  a  certain  a  priori  reason  why  the
kinaesthetic images ought to be the last psychic antecedents of the outgoing currents,
and why we should expect these currents to be insentient.”33 James holds that the will is
motivated just by the anticipatory image of a movement. The motivational core of will is
the  idea  of  movements  and its  different  variations.  “The bare  idea  is  sufficient,  but
sometimes an additional conscious element, in the shape of a fiat, mandate, or express
consent, has to intervene and precede the movement.”34 The inner structure of volition
seems to be epistemological, because the decision of will is always based on a bare idea
and sometimes its decision is not even necessary. This is due to the telos of every volition;
indeed it consists in the representation of what memory can recall. The will takes its
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decision on the basis of what is represented. From this it might be inferred that the key
step of every act of will is the representation of the previous movement. Although the
kinaesthetic moment is the source of what will is going to do, this movement has to be
represented before every decision is taken. Free will can be accounted for as a habit of an
ideo-motor action, as Cotkin35 points out; but the very core of this movement is a well
known representation of the reasons and consequences of this deed. The example James
posed is clear. If we lie in a warm bed in a cold morning, we decide to wake up because “a
fortunate lapse of consciousness occurs; we forget both the warmth and the cold; we fall
into some revery connected with the day’s life, in the course of which the idea flashes
across us, “Hollo! I must lie here no longer” - an idea which at that lucky instant awakens
no contradictory or paralyzing suggestions, and consequently produces immediately its
appropriate motor effects. It was our acute consciousness of both the warmth and the
cold during the period of struggle, which paralyzed our activity then and kept our idea of
rising in the condition of wish and not of will. The moment these inhibitory ideas ceased,
the original idea exerted its effects.”36
17 The education of consciousness by repeated acts affects our decision to wake up and to
break down the flow of our desires and competing ideas. The conception of duty leads us to
jump out of the bed and to resolve the struggle between opposite ideas. We know what we
have to  do because we have been taught  to  follow the conception which has  better
implications. There is not the effort of any feeling, but reasoning activity. “The terminus
of the psychological process in volition, the point to which the will is directly applied, is
always an idea. […] The only resistance which our will can possibly experience is the
resistance which such an idea offers to being attended to at all. To attend to it is the
volitional act, and the only inward volitional act which we ever perform.”37 When we
want to do something, we give our consent to a specific representation of an idea. The
freedom of will consists in the act of a choice between different representations. Instinct
and feeling seem to be regulated by knowledge. The fiat of our will is, according to James,
generated by the consent to a specific conception which is at the basis of an idea. Hence if
willing means ‘sustaining a representation,’38 which is the very domain of will? What does
freedom mean?
18 In James willing terminates with the prevalence of the idea. Whether the act follows or not
is a matter that is quite immaterial, so far as the willing itself goes. I want to write, and
the act follows.39 Freedom is not taken into consideration because the epistemological and
psychological sides of his analysis prevail over the moral one. Freedom is considered just
as a sort of an “effort of attention”40 to consent to a specific idea. Both will and its freedom
are reduced to the activity of attention and memory. “Freedom – James writes – is the
very activity of attention. The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most
‘voluntary,’ is to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing
is the fiat.”41 Attention is the index of the mobile mastery of consciousness in the entire
cycle of its activity: a) in the perceptual structuring of the flow of experience b) in the
projection of  patterns of  meaning;  c)  in the natural  culmination of  these projects  in
concrete corporeal activity. In this sense freedom is not considered as an actual property
of  will,  but  as  a  modalization  of  the  attention  which  has  to  zero  in  on  different
representations  of  objects.  Freedom  belongs  more  to  the  epistemological  activity  of
consciousness than to the practical activity. From a psychological point of view free will ‐
is not a consistent faculty because it is just the fiat of an attention linked up to reasonable
representations experienced by the mind.42 The natural consequence of this analysis is
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both to subordinate the will to an epistemological mechanism and to make it an illusion
or a dogmatic faculty.
19 In an excerpt,  which dates back to 1870,  James reaches the same conclusions from a
biographical point of view: “I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the
first part of Renouvier’s second ‘Essais’ and see no reason why his definition of Free Will –
‘the sustaining of a thought because I chose to when I might have other thoughts’ – need
be the definition of an illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the present – until next year
– that it is no illusion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.”43 Free will is
mostly an illusion which can be rationalized by an act of belief. Freedom is an idea of
reason we have to trust in, but which cannot be proved. The epistemological support of
will falls short just when it has to explain the rational foundation of free activity. The
main foundation of free will consists in its submission to the strength of belief. There is,
accordingly, no domain for a pure moral activity. If freedom of will is fixed by an act of
belief or by a dogma, the resulting ethics will be dogmatic or religious. The will is lacking
in its  moral  component whenever it  is  linked up to the epistemological  activity of  a
subject or to a dogmatic or religious choice, because its freedom is accounted for just as
an ‘illusion’ or as an automatic response to a representation.
 
a) The Will in Husserl
20 What  strikes  the  attention  of  the  reader  is  the  likeness between  the  ‘ethical’
consequences of two different philosophical studies of consciousness. Like James, Husserl
develops an analysis of consciousness in which the epistemological side of consciousness
prevails over the others. Both give a definition of will in which the realm of will is nearly
neutralized by  the  epistemological  activity.  Yet  the  moral  thought  they deal  with is
different. Whereas James delineates an ethical thought which is based on the dogma or
‘illusion’ of freedom, Husserl provides for an ethical discipline in which there is no need
for freedom because it is almost replaced by an axiological and epistemological weighing
up. Every ethical choice is in fact based on the mathematical calculation of values and
logical arguments which allow one to support it.44
21 In Husserl one of the first analytical descriptions of the will can be found in the ethical
lectures  of  1914.  These lectures  are the result  of  the ethical  research that  had been
carried  out  by  Husserl  since  1902.  In  his  Husserls  Phänomenologie  des  Willens,  Melle45
sketches out the main influences on Husserl’s work. Namely, he refers to the work of
James46 and Ehrenfels.47 The former holds that the main characteristic of will is attention
and its fiat, that is, the ‘act of mental consent.’ The latter construes the act of will not as a
founding act, because it is just a pretension (Forderung) of something and thus it needs the
representative acts of logical reason.
22 The description of will of 1914 is affected by these two philosophical positions. The will is
considered  as  a  parallel  modalization  of  consciousness.  It  represents  the  grasp  of
consciousness of willing or doing something. It is described as a logical act that belongs to
the realm of operating. Its distinctive characteristic is that of “fiat!”48 Its fiat is a creative
and distinctive feature by which the act of will yields a new reality. Every act of will is at
the basis of an action that modifies reality in a certain way or adds new elements to it.
The thesis  of  will  (Willensthesis) is  mainly a position of  realization and creation.  This
activity itself can be thought of by following different modes: “Für alle Abwandlungen des
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Urteils-bewußtseins  finden  wir  so  und  apriori  parallele  Abwandlungen  des
Willensbewußtseins.”49
23 Husserl maintains the existence of a parallelism between logical and practical reason.
These two kinds of reason can modalize themselves in the same ways. It is possible, in
fact, that we can desire something with conviction or doubt, with desire or fear or with
many other expressions. These modes correspond to the different modalities of judgment
of logical reason, such as, for example, those of assertions or questions or doubts and so
forth. There are a great number of a priori rational expressions of will and logical reason.
The absolute  rationality  of  these  remains  the same,  although they are  different  and
realize themselves in a human context. Nevertheless, the symmetry between practical
and logical reason is not possible at all, as they have similar ways to express themselves
in the world.  Yet the a priori  and rational structures of will  can work only with the
support of logical reason. As we said before, the will depends on logical grasp to interpret
reality and represent it. “Wollungen sind fundiert durch doxischen Thesen und zugleich
durch Thesen der Sphäre der Wertungen. Fundierte Thesen haben nicht nur Richtigkeit
überhaupt und in dem Sinn, daß sie ihre doxische,  axiologische,  praktische Wahrheit
bzw. Unwahrheit habe, sondern sie ‘richten’ sich auch nach ihren Fundament-Thesen.”50
24 Following Husserl, even if the will can generally be considered parallel to logical reason,
it needs the support of logical reason to found its acts. Indeed, it is necessary to know an
object, in order to refer to it. Husserl, too, considers representations to be the basis of
every act of will. The quality and the matter which make up every act of consciousness
are  linked  in  the  epistemological  representation  of  logical  reason.51 Acts  of  will  are
strictly connected to the reason of thinking, because we cannot do anything if we do not
know the things  toward which we act.  “Dabei  setzt  jeder  Wille  nicht  nur überhaupt
Vorstellung  des  Gewollten  voraus,  sondern  er  hat  notwendig  eine  umfassende
Vorstellungsunterlage und […] das Gewollte auch eine Glaubensunterlage bezogen auf
reales Sein.”52
25 When we want something, we have to represent and know our object. The will depends
necessarily  on  logical  reason  both  for  the  expression  of  its  intentions  and  for  its
realization. In this context the definition of will is in harmony with one used in the first
and second editions of Logische Untersuchungen.53 Here, in fact, Husserl wrote that there is
not a parallelism between logical and practical reason, because the latter depends on the
former in its pure and rational activity. This is not completely an intentional kind of
reason,54 because its acts cannot represent their objects. It refers to its objects usually in
an impulsive or instinctive way.55 The realization of will  is,  in fact,  reliant on logical
reason and on its predicative or representative “voice.”56 Without the representations of
predicative reason, the will cannot represent the objects of its volitions to itself. Thus, the
reason of  pure consciousness  is  logical.  On the contrary,  the reason of  will  is  just  a
psychological reason that can be purely rational only by means of the ‘objectivating’ help
of logical reason. Moreover, the values supplied by axiological reason provide the rational
orientation of any choice. This means that every logical representation in fact can be
placed  in  a  graduated  table  of  values  and  the  best  fiat  will  be  based  on  the
accomplishment of the best value.
26 As for the Husserlian ethical lectures of 1914, freedom is not mentioned. Differently from
James, the response of will is not only an automatic kinaesthetic movement, but also a
choice resulting from the weighing of  considerations by the subject.  Yet,  like James,
Husserl  hints  at  freedom,  without  mentioning it,  with regard to the moment of  fiat.
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Freedom, in fact, consists in the capacity of will to consent or not to a specific doxic
representation of logical reason. The Entscheidung consists in an axiological weighing up
(Wertabwägung) of the objects experienced and represented by the predicative voice of
logical reason.57 Freedom is connected to the logical property of reason and it  is not
placed in the realm of instinct or emotions. “Der Wille geht auf Wirklichkeit, nicht ideale,
sondern individuelle, reale Wirklichkeit. […] Dabei setzt jeder Wille nicht nur überhaupt
Vorstellung der Gewollten voraus, sondern er hat eine Glaubensunterlage bezogen auf
reales Sein.”58 It exists as acknowledgment of the rationality (epistemological or logical
rationality)  of  a  motivation59 “So  gibt  es  ein  völlig  ohne  Begründungsunterlage
erfolgendes  Wollen  und  ein  durch  Gründe  motiviertes,  ein  Wollen  in  Form  klarer
praktischer Vernunft und ein Wollen, das Vernunftmotive einschließt, aber unklare usw.
[…]  Das  Wollen  im  ursprünglichen  Sinn  ist  das  Analogon  des  Gewissheit,  ich  setze
schlechthin und praktisch als seinsollend: ‘Es werde!’.”60 Freedom can be considered as
the final granting of an act. It is what lets the act be as it has to be. It is the axiological
and epistemological choice related to what logical reason represented.
27 Both philosophers think about will  in an epistemological  way.  Its  activity is  close to
logical rationality or representative ideas. Both James and Husserl seek to carry on just a
genetic  analysis,  free  from  any  epistemological  implications,  but  they  fall  into  an
epistemo-logical idea of morality which leaves little room for any voluntary choice. Ethics
cannot exist without the idea of freedom. Therefore, the subsequent moral writings of
James and Husserl are the consequences of these philosophic positions. In Will to Believe
morality is based on the act of belief and it is above all a kind of religious morality. In the
Husserlian  ethical  lectures  of  1920,  there  is  not  a  pure  moral  system,  but  an
epistemological analysis of the inner structure of the ethical deed. Therefore, according
to our study, in James and Husserl there are not only many similarities but also a common
theory of will which excludes an idea of freedom which is autonomous from
epistemological  reason.  It  follows that  morality is  above all  a  morality of  consent to
believe or to follow what reason thinks.
28 To conclude it is worthwhile to emphasize the following points:
as though James and Husserl belong to different philosophic movements, they carry on
similar pathways in their analysis of consciousness;
the definition of will they work out is deeply linked to the epistemological layer of the
activity of consciousness;
these reasons led James to pose freedom as an act of belief of free will and Husserl to
subordinate the will to the activity of logical reason. Both reduce the foundation of pure
morality to being in virtue of a dogmatic or automatic choice.
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